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Abstract
Learning Riders’ Preferences in Ridesharing Platforms
Ritaban Bhattacharya, M.S.
Rochester Institute of Technology, 2020
Ridesharing platforms allow people to commute more efficiently. Ridesharing
can be beneficial since it can reduce the travel expenses for individuals as well
as decrease the overall traffic gridlocks. One of the key aspects of ridesharing
platforms is for riders to find suitable partners to share the ride. Thus, the
riders need to be matched to other riders/drivers. From the social perspective,
a rider may prefer to share the ride with certain individuals as opposed to
other riders. This leads to the rider having preferences over the other riders.
A matching based on social welfare indicates the quality of the rides. Our goal
is to maximize the social welfare or the quality of rides for all riders. In order
to match the riders, we need to know the preferences of the riders. However,
the preferences are often unknown.
To tackle these situations, we introduce a ridesharing model that im-
plements reinforcement learning algorithms to learn the utilities of the riders
based on the riders’ previous experiences. We investigate a variety of measures
for assessing social welfare, including utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and lex-
imin social welfare. Additionally, we also compute the number of strong and
iii
weak blocking pairs in each socially optimal matching to compare the stabil-
ity of these matchings. We provide a comparison between two reinforcement
learning algorithms: ε-greedy and UCB1, for learning utilities of the riders,
maximizing social welfare, and the number of blocking pairs in the socially
optimal matching.
The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 provides the maximum accuracy
in learning the utilities of the riders as compared to ε = 0.0, ε = 0.01, and
UCB1 algorithm. It also provides fewer number of blocking pairs suggesting
more stability in the socially optimal matching than other reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms. However, UCB1 algorithm outperforms all other reinforcement
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Ridesharing is a method of shared transportation where people share
a car in order to reach their destination. Nowadays, people use ridesharing
for most of their daily commute’s like travelling to office, grocery shopping,
going to a party or to visit friends places. Each individual participating in the
ridesharing platform can save money since it allows the co-travellers to divide
the travel expenses. Conceptually, ridesharing is a system that can combine
the flexibility and speed of private cars with the reduced cost of fixed-line
systems [FDO+13].
The core of a ridesharing platform is to match riders with other suitable
riders. A matching between two riders implies that the two riders share a single
ride. A rider may prefer to share the ride with specific riders. Hence, a rider
has preferences over the other riders. Based on some relevant criteria, the
order that a rider provides to others is called the preference of that rider.
This criterion can be social welfare between the riders. Social welfare is an
essential aspect as it can determine the well-being of the riders [FS06]. The
preferences of the riders can be represented as both cardinal and ordinal. The
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preferences are depicted cardinally using utility functions [HGY18]. Different
notions of social welfare can be used to provide matching between riders with
high overall utility. The overall quality of the matching is measured by the
social welfare of the matching. Existing studies focus on matching the riders
based on social welfare [AD10, GZPH15, ACGD12, Les19]. The matching
which guarantees the maximum social welfare is known as a socially optimal
matching [FS06]. It provides the highest overall quality of the matching. Since
it focuses only on the overall quality of the matching, it may not provide
maximum benefit to each individual rider. A rider may believe there is a better
match available than his current match. A matching is defined as a stable
matching if no two riders, currently matched to others, would prefer to be
matched together [Irv85]. Such a pair of riders is called a blocking pair to the
matching. A stable matching guarantees individual satisfaction of the riders
with their matches [WAE18]. The stability of a socially optimal matching can
be computed by the number of blocking pairs in the matching [BMM10]. There
are existing researches focused on providing stable matching between riders
[PSJ+20, RC19, YLL+19, MYSJ19]. To provide a socially optimal matching,
we need to know the preferences of the riders. There are situations where
the utilities of the riders are not known beforehand. For instance, the riders
participating in the ridesharing platform may not have any prior experience
or exposure to sharing the rides with other riders. In those cases, we need to
compute the socially optimal matching while learning the utility of the riders.
We design a model for computing the socially optimal matchings be-
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tween the riders under different social welfare concepts while learning the util-
ities for the riders. We employ techniques from reinforcement learning [SB98]
algorithms to determine the utilities of the riders based on their previous
matchings. Upon receiving the expected utilities of the riders, we consider a
variety of welfare measures to assess the quality of outcomes for a population
of riders like utilitarian [Ben23], egalitarian [Har75], Nash [KN79] and, leximin
social welfare [d’A85]. The matchings with maximum welfare for each measure
are the socially optimal matchings. To check the stability of those matchings,
we also provide a comparison between the number of blocking pairs in each
socially optimal matching. We answer the following research questions in this
thesis:
How do we learn the utilities of the riders to improve the social
welfare among a population of riders in the ridesharing platforms?
Which reinforcement learning algorithm performs better for learn-
ing the utilities of the riders? Which reinforcement learning algo-
rithm performs better with respect to social welfare and stability?
1.2 Contributions
We introduce a multi-agent reinforcement learning model where each
rider is modeled as a multi-armed bandit [Rob52]. It is similar to a multi-
agent multi-armed bandit. The goal is to learn the expected utilities of the
riders while maximizing their social welfare. We consider four well-established
reinforcement learning algorithms: ε-greedy [Wat89] with ε = 0.0, ε = 0.01,
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ε = 0.1, and UCB1 [ACBF02]. The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 out-
performs all other reinforcement learning algorithms in terms of accuracy in
learning expected utilities of the riders. The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1
learns the expected utilities of the riders faster than UCB1 algorithm with bet-
ter accuracy while UCB1 algorithm learns the expected utilities at a steady
rate. The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.0 gets stuck at a sub-optimal match-
ing. Due to less exploration in the ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.01, it learns
the expected utilities of the riders with lower accuracy than the ε-greedy al-
gorithm with ε = 0.1.
We provide socially optimal matchings using utilitarian, egalitarian,
Nash, and leximin social welfare for expected utilities learned using each re-
inforcement algorithm and provide a comparison between them. UCB1 algo-
rithm outperforms all other reinforcement learning algorithms to provide the
maximum welfare in the socially optimal matchings.
Additionally, we also compute the number of strong and weak blocking
pairs in each socially optimal matching to compare their stability. Compared
to UCB1 algorithm, the ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 has fewer number of
strong blocking pairs in most of the socially optimal matchings. This indicates
that socially optimal matchings computed using ε-greedy algorithm with ε =
0.1 are more stable than socially optimal matchings computed using UCB1
algorithm.
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 talks about other signif-
icant researches in the field of matching, social welfare, and learning utilities
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in the ridesharing platform. Chapter 3 provides model formulation along with
basic terminology and definitions. It introduces the definition of matching,
social welfare, and stability of socially optimal matchings. Also, the model
formulation for the reinforcement learning algorithm is described along with
the algorithms implemented. The experimental set-up and results of the model
are described in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5, the conclusion is drawn,
and the future directions of the thesis are listed out along with the advantages




A stable matching is defined as the matching where there are no two
agents, who prefer each other rather than their current partner. The stable
marriage problem devised by Gale and Shapley [GS62] confirm that between
two equally sized sets of agents (men and women), there always exists a stable
matching. A more general and algebraic context for the stable marriage prob-
lem has been developed by Gusfield and Irving [GI89]. A generalization to the
stable matching problem is the stable roommate problem [Irv85]. As opposed
to stable marriage problem where the matching is between two equally sized
sets, the stable roommate problem provides stable matching for agents of the
same even-sized set. For a stable roommate problem, there is no guarantee for
a stable matching to exist. But, the stable roommate problem guarantees to
find a stable matching, if one exists.
Learning of the user preferences by maintaining high user desirability
has been proposed by Montazery and Wilson [MW16]. In their model they
consider two disjoint sets of drivers (D) and riders (R) and all requests are
defined by the set S = R ∪ D. They define matching as a bipartite graph
G = (D,R,E), with E representing the edges of the graph, and for Si, Sj ∈ S,
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the gain of the matching Si and Sj is the weight cij. They propose the model
to provide a set of best possible matching concerning the weight cij. Since
the model learns the preferences from a training data, this is a supervised
learning model. They classify the supervised learning model as a regression
problem where the model learns a scoring function from the preference list.
The scoring function measures the expected satisfaction for the individual of
the matching by generating a value for each matching [MW16]. To learn the
scoring function, they develop a deduction of conventional Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [Joa02]. The experiments are performed in real ridesharing
records.
An online stable approach for preference-aware agents in online taxi
dispatching has been proposed by Zhao et al. [ZXS+19]. They define their
model as online stable matching under known identical independent distribu-
tions which maximizes the expected total profits and also try to satisfy the
preferences among drivers and riders by minimizing the expected total num-
ber of blocking pairs [ZXS+19]. They define matching as a bipartite graph
G = (U, V,E), where U represents the set of offline drivers, V represents set of
online riders, and the edge f = (u, v) represents that driver u is matched with
v which is also associated with a distance d(u, v) > 0. They define wv > 0 as
the profit for v when it is matched. They define preference over the sets such
that if wv > wv′ , u prefers v over v
′, and if d(u, v) > d(u′, v), v prefers u over
u′. The model designs an linear programming algorithm to provide,
1. max E[
∑
v∈VM wv], where VM is set of riders matched in M
7
[ZXS+19].
2. min E[BP (M)], where BP (M) represented number of block-
ing pairs in M [ZXS+19].
They also provide a competitive ratio to evaluate the performance of their
online maximization algorithm.
Learning preferences of agents for matching is designed as a two-sided
bandit problem for dating markets by Das and Kamenica [DK05]. Their model
focuses on learning of agents in a one-to-one two-sided matching. According
to their model, M is the set of men and W is set of women participating in the
dating market for T time. They define matching similar to the definition of sta-
ble marriage problem [GS62]. The examine three matching mechanism: Gale
Shapley matching [GS62], simultaneous offers, and sequential offers [DK05].
The model provides the matching by implementing ε-greedy algorithm with
different variations of ε.
The social welfare in one-sided matching markets for efficiently allo-
cating n items to n agents who have preferences over the items is studied by
Bhalgat et al. [BCK11]. They examine two natural measures of social wel-
fare: ordinal social welfare and linear social welfare. According to their model,
ordinal social welfare measures the satisfaction of each agent and linear wel-
fare measures the decreasing agent’s utility over the preference lists. They
analyze two matching mechanisms: random serial dictatorship [AS98] to allo-
cate items fairly among the agents using randomly chosen permutation, and
8






The agents are the riders participating in the ridesharing model. It is
defined as the set N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2n}. Without loss of generality, we focus
on even number of riders. So the total number of riders are |N | = 2n. Let the
set of all matching be M .
A matching between the riders is defined as a one-to-one mapping
between riders in the set N ,
µ : N → N
such that µ(i) 6= µ(j), ∀i, j ∈ N . A rider can only be matched with one other
rider. Currently, the model only supports two riders sharing a ride. Therefore,
it is assumed that only two riders can share a ride.
Example 1. Assume there are four riders r1, r2, r3, r4, participating
in the ridesharing algorithm. Therefore, N = {r1, r2, r3, r4}. An instance of
the matching would be µ(r1) = r2 and µ(r3) = r4, i.e. r1 is matched with r2
and r3 is matched with r4.
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The satisfaction of the rider faced with options is denoted by prefer-
ence of the rider [ASS02]. The preference profile represents the preference of
the each rider i ∈ N over the set of alternate riders, N \ i. We consider two
kinds of preference profile, cardinal and ordinal.
Utility is an evaluation measure for cardinal preference profile [Fis68].
Each rider has a utility over all other riders, denoted as Ui. The set of all
utilities can be shown as a 2n× 2n matrix as follows,
U =

−∞ u1,2 . . . u1,2n





u2n,1 u2n,2 . . . −∞
 = (ui,j) ∈ [0, 1]2n×2n,∀i, j i 6= j
where each element ui,j represents the utility of µ(i) = j, i.e., the utility of rider
i for rider j. We assume that a rider cannot be matched with himself and no
rider remains unmatched. Therefore we consider the minimal possible utility
of a rider for himself, ∀i ∈ N, ui,i = −∞. When the utilities are uncertain,
we use expected utility. The expected mean utility of a rider is defined as
the mean of the expected utilities of the matching between the rider and the







In Example 1, assume the expected utilities of rider r1 when sharing
the ride with r2 is 0.8, with r3 is 0.6 and with r4 is 0.9. So, the expected utility
vector for r1 will be Ur1 = [−∞, 0.8, 0.6, 0.9]. The expected mean utility of
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rider r1 would be
0.8+0.6+0.9
3
= 0.77. Similarly, assume the utility vectors for
riders r2, r3, r4 are Ur2 = [0.6,−∞, 0.7, 0.8], Ur3 = [0.2, 0.7,−∞, 0.5], and
Ur4 = [0.8, 0.2, 0.1,−∞], respectively.
Figure 3.1: Depiction of Example 1 where the possible matchings of riders are
represented by the edges and each weight on an edge represents the expected
utility of rider ri for rider rj (ui,j), where i, j ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4].
3.2 Social Welfare Functions
Social welfare is a measure to determine the well-being of the riders.
The accumulation of the preference of the riders can be defined using the
concept of social welfare [FS06]. Various aspects of social welfare measure can
be utilized to provide matching between riders with high overall quality. A
matching which provides maximum social welfare is called a socially optimal
matching. Socially optimal matching guarantees the highest overall quality of
12
the matching. To investigate the performance of the algorithm, we consider
various social welfare concepts to provide socially optimal matchings. The
matching procedure is centralized, meaning the algorithm will decide the final
matching for the riders after considering the expected utilities of the riders.
3.2.1 Utilitarian Social Welfare
Utilitarian social welfare [Ben23] is defined as the measure of the quality
of the matching from the outlook of the system as a whole [CDU+06]. It can










In Example 1, the expected utilities are,
U =

−∞ 0.8 0.6 0.9
0.6 −∞ 0.7 0.8
0.2 0.7 −∞ 0.5
0.8 0.3 1 −∞

The set of all possible matchings M would be µ1 = [(r1, r2), (r3, r4)], µ2 =
[(r1, r3), (r2, r4)], and µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)].
The utilitarian social welfare of the matchings are,
swutil(µ1) = 0.8 + 0.6 + 0.5 + 1 = 2.9
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
−∞ 0.8 0.6 0.9
0.6 −∞ 0.7 0.8
0.2 0.7 −∞ 0.5
0.8 0.3 1 −∞


−∞ 0.8 0.6 0.9
0.6 −∞ 0.7 0.8
0.2 0.7 −∞ 0.5
0.8 0.3 1 −∞


−∞ 0.8 0.6 0.9
0.6 −∞ 0.7 0.8
0.2 0.7 −∞ 0.5
0.8 0.3 1 −∞

Figure 3.2: The expected utilities of the riders in matching µ1, µ2, and µ3,
respectively. The circles indicate the expected utilities of the matched riders.
swutil(µ2) = 0.6 + 0.8 + 0.2 + 0.2 = 1.8
swutil(µ3) = 0.9 + 0.7 + 0.7 + 0.8 = 3.1
Hence, the socially optimal matching based on utilitarian social welfare is the
one with the maximum utilitarian social welfare which is µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)].
3.2.2 Egalitarian Social Welfare
Egalitarian social welfare [Har75] is defined as the expected utility of















Hence, the socially optimal matching based on egalitarian social welfare is the
one with the maximum egalitarian social welfare which is µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)].
In this case, the socially optimal matching using both utilitarian and egalitar-
ian social welfare is same. However, this does not indicate the socially optimal
matching for utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare will remain same for all
cases.
3.2.3 Nash Social Welfare
The Nash social welfare [KN79] is defined as the product of the expected
utilities of the riders, given the matching [BCH+17].
swNash(µ) = Πi∈Nui,µ(i)




In Example 1, the Nash social welfare of the matchings are,
swNash(µ1) = 0.8× 0.6× 0.5× 1 = 0.24
swNash(µ2) = 0.6× 0.8× 0.2× 0.2 = 0.0192
swNash(µ3) = 0.9× 0.7× 0.7× 0.8 = 0.3528
Hence, the socially optimal matching based on Nash social welfare is the one
with the maximum Nash product which is µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)].
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3.2.4 Leximin Social Welfare
The leximin social welfare [d’A85] is a social welfare ordering that re-
fines egalitarian social welfare [CDU+06]. It works same as egalitarian social
welfare by comparing the minimum utilities of each matching settings µ ∈M .
It is different from egalitarian social welfare as when the minimum utilities
coincide, it compares the utilities of the next matching with minimum utilities
in the coinciding matching settings, and so on until it finds a utility which is
higher than the utility of the other matching. It is denoted by swlex.








Hence, the socially optimal matching based on leximin ordering is µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)].
Example 2. There are four riders r1, r2, r3, and r4. Assume the
utility matrix of the riders is
U =

−∞ 0.6 0.7 0.4
0.4 −∞ 0.9 0.6
0.7 0.6 −∞ 0.8
0.7 0.5 0.6 −∞

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The set of matchings M is µ1 = [(r1, r2), (r3, r4)], µ2 = [(r1, r3), (r2, r4)], and
µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)]. The minimum utility of the matchings are 0.4 for µ1,
0.4 for µ2, 0.6 for µ3, and 0.5 for µ4. Since the minimum utility of matching
in µ1 and µ2 are equal, the next minimum utility is computed which are 0.6
for µ1 and 0.6 for µ2 which are equal again. The next minimum utility are
0.7 for µ1 and 0.9 for µ2. Since µ2 has the higher utility, the socially optimal
matching based on leximin ordering is µ2 = [(r1, r3), (r2, r4)].
3.3 Stable Matching
Stability in a desirable property of matching as there is empirical evi-
dence that links stability to market failures [Rot00]. According to the stable
roommate problem [Irv85], a matching is stable if there are no two riders,
who prefer each other rather than their matches. Such a pair is said to be
a blocking pair with respect to the matching. For an even-sized set, a stable
matching can be found by the the stable roommate problem. For certain num-
ber of riders and their preferences, a stable matching may fail to exist. Stable
roommate problem guarantees to find a stable matching, if it exists. Stable
matching guarantees that no two riders will form a blocking pair. A matching
with fewer number of blocking pairs is considered to be more stable than a
matching with higher number of blocking pairs.
Strong Blocking Pair. A pair (i, j), where i, j ∈ N is in matching µ, is
called a strong blocking pair, if both i and j strictly prefer each other more
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than their matched rider µ(i) and µ(j). Pair (i, j) is a strong blocking pair if
(i, j) for ∀i, j ∈ N, ui,j > ui,µ(i) and uj,i > uj,µ(j)
A matching with strong blocking pair (i, j) suggests that both riders in pair
(i, j) are not satisfied with their match.
Weak Blocking Pair. A pair (i, j), where i, j ∈ N is in matching µ, is
called a weak blocking pair, if both i and j prefer each other atleast as much
as their matched rider µ(i) and µ(j). Pair (i, j) is a weak blocking pair if
(i, j) for ∀i, j ∈ N, ui,j ≥ ui,µ(i) and uj,i > uj,µ(j)
A matching with weak blocking pair (i, j) suggests that the rider i is as much
satisfied with rider j as with it’s matched rider but rider j strictly prefers i
more than its matched rider.
The strong blocking pairs are subsets of weak blocking pairs. All strong
blocking pairs are weak blocking pairs but not vice-versa. A matching µ is
called a weakly stable matching if there is no strong blocking pair in the
matching µ. If there is no weak blocking pair in matching µ, then the matching
is called a strongly stable matching.
In Example 1, the socially optimal matching based on utilitarian, egal-
itarian and Nash social welfare is µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)]. For the pairs (r1, r2)
and (r1, r3), both prefer their matching than each other. For the pair (r2, r4),
ur2,r4 > ur2,µ3(r2) but ur4,µ3(r4) > ur4,r2 . There are no two riders in the matching
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µ3 who strictly prefer each other than their matches. There are no two riders
in the matching µ3 who prefer each other atleast as much as their matches.
So there are no strong or weak blocking pairs in the matching µ3, so µ3 is a
strongly stable matching. The socially optimal matching based on leximin
ordering is µ2 = [(r1, r3), (r2, r4)]. For pair (r1, r4), ur1,r4 > ur1,µ(r1) and
ur4,r1 > ur4,µ(r3), which is a strong blocking pair. Hence, µ2 is not a stable
matching.
Example 3. There are four riders r1, r2, r3, and r4. Assume the
expected utilities of the riders are,
U =

−∞ 0.6 0.7 0.5
0.5 −∞ 0.9 0.6
0.7 0.6 −∞ 0.5
0.5 0.4 0.6 −∞

The set of matchings M is µ1 = [(r1, r2), (r3, r4)], µ2 = [(r1, r3), (r2, r4)], and
µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)].
swutil(µ1) = 0.6 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.6 = 2.2
swutil(µ2) = 0.7 + 0.7 + 0.6 + 0.4 = 2.4
swutil(µ3) = 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.9 + 0.6 = 2.5
The socially optimal matching based on utilitarian social welfare is µ3 =
[(r1, r4), (r2, r3)]. For pair (r1, r3), ur1,r3 > ur1,µ(r1) and ur3,r1 > ur3,µ(r3), which
is a strong blocking pair. Hence, µ3 is not a stable matching (Figure 3.3).
The Nash social welfare of the set of matchings M are,
swNash(µ1) = 0.6× 0.5× 0.5× 0.6 = 0.09
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swNash(µ2) = 0.7× 0.7× 0.6× 0.4 = 0.1176
swNash(µ3) = 0.5× 0.5× 0.9× 0.6 = 0.135
The socially optimal matching based on Nash social welfare is µ3 = [(r1, r4), (r2, r3)],
which is not a stable matching.
U =

−∞ 0.6 0.7 0.5
0.5 −∞ 0.9 0.6
0.7 0.6 −∞ 0.5
0.5 0.4 0.6 −∞

Figure 3.3: Unstable matching µ3 where utilities of socially optimal match-
ing using utilitarian and Nash social welfare is circled and blocking pair is
underlined




The socially optimal matching based on egalitarian social welfare is µ2 =
[(r1, r3), (r2, r4)]. There are no two riders in the matching µ2 who strictly
prefer each other than their matches. There are no two riders in the matching
µ2 who prefer each other atleast as much as their matches. Since, there are





−∞ 0.6 0.7 0.5
0.5 −∞ 0.9 0.6
0.7 0.6 −∞ 0.5
0.5 0.4 0.6 −∞

Figure 3.4: Stable matching µ2 where utilities of socially optimal matching
using egalitarian social welfare is circled
3.4 The Reinforcement Learning Model
The reinforcement learning model is based on a similar setting of stochas-
tic n-armed bandit [Rob52, SB98]. In the multi-armed bandit problem, a ban-
dit has n different options to choose from, where n is the number of arms for
the bandit [SB98]. After each action, it receives a reward chosen from some
probability distribution. The goal of the multi-arm bandit problem to the
maximize the total reward received over the time period.
In our model, each rider i ∈ N is modeled as a bandit, and the alternate
riders N \ i are modeled as arms of the bandit. In Example 1, for rider r1 as
bandit, the arms will be r2, r3, and r4. Similarly, for rider r2 as bandit, the arms
are r1, r3, and r4. For rider r3 as bandit, the arms are r1, r2, and r4, and for
rider r4 as bandit, the arms are r1, r2, and r3. There are 2n multi-armed bandit
problems running simultaneously for learning the respective expected utilities
while maximizing their social welfare. The model is similar to a multi-agent
multi-armed bandit. Our reinforcement learning model is a tuple < N,U,M >
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where N is the set of riders, U denotes the expected utilities of the riders, and
M denotes the set of all matchings.
Action. The set of actions are denoted as the set of all possible matchings
M .
Reward. The individual reward of a rider is denoted as the expected utility
ui,j, ∀i, j ∈ N . The total reward for all the riders is the expected utility matrix
U.
For each rider, i ∈ N , the model has 2n− 1 possible matches to choose
from, and there are |T | time steps. Let µt(i) be the proposed match for rider
i ∈ N , at time step t ∈ T . The model’s goal is to maximize the expected mean
utility of each rider i over T time steps. As in the case of stochastic bandits
[Sli19], the three essential assumptions in the model are:
• The model observes nothing else but only the utility for the proposed
match.
• For each rider i ∈ N , there is a distribution Ui,j for each alternate rider
j ∈ N called the utility distribution. For each proposed match, the
expected utility is sampled independently from this distribution, which
is initially unknown to the model. The expected utilities are bounded to
interval [0, 1] for simplicity.
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• The utility distributions are fully specified by the expected utilities of
the respective distributions. For each rider i, j ∈ N , the expected utility
of the distribution Ui,j is,
ui,j = E[ Ui,j ]
3.4.1 Expected Utility of the proposed match
At each time step, for each rider, utility is received as a reward for a
proposed match. Given a matching, the expected utility is the average of the
utilities of the riders for their respective matches. The problem with averaging
the utilities is that its memory and computational requirements grow over
time without bound [SB98]. Therefore, an incremental update formula [SB98]
is devised for computing the averages. For rider i ∈ N , let ui,µk(i) be the
utility of rider i received when matched with µ(i) for the kth time. Initially
the expected utility is defined by a default value, such as ui,µ(i) = 0. The
incremental update formula for computing the expected utility of the rider i
is




3.4.2 Computing socially optimal matchings
At each time step, for each rider, the algorithm learns the expected
utility of the proposed match for the rider and updates the expected utility
matrix U . Once the algorithm has proposed matches for all riders for the
time step, using the updated expected utility matrix U , it computes the social
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welfare based on utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash and leximin ordering (as de-
scribed in Section 3.2) for all possible matchings µ ∈M . The matchings with
the maximum social welfare for each welfare concept are the socially optimal
matchings for the time step.
Constant utilities and Utilities from stationary distributions. Con-
stant utilities are the utilities that are fixed and do not change over time. For
each rider i ∈ N , 2n− 1 utilities are sampled from the respective distributions
and they remain the same over the time-steps. The utilities that are sampled
from the respective stationary distributions at each time step are called utili-
ties from stationary distribution. For each time step and for each rider i ∈ N ,
2n− 1 utilities are sampled from the respective distributions.
For each rider i ∈ N , the best proposed match, i.e., the match with




The performance measure of the model is evaluated by minimizing the total
regret [SB98] for each rider which is formally defined as,




Note that µt(i) is a random quantity as it depends on the utilities sampled
from the distribution at the time step t, so Ri(T ) is also a random variable.
The expected regret of the rider i is denoted by E[Ri(T )].
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At each time step, the reinforcement learning algorithm is faced with
choice of whether to use to current information it has gained to propose a
match, or try to learn more and propose a random match. The fundamental
choice of reinforcement learning models is the exploration and exploitation
trade-off [Mar91]. Exploration indicates searching for better choices and ex-
ploitation refers to make the best choice based on the current knowledge.
3.5 Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
3.5.1 Epsilon Greedy
A greedy algorithm always takes the action that has the best payoff
at that moment. This might lead to bad long term consequences. Similar to
greedy algorithm, the epsilon greedy or ε-greedy algorithm [Wat89] takes the
action with the best payoff, however from time to time it explores the other
available actions [Whi12]. It is widely used because it is very simple, and is
very successful in most empirical problems. It provides a mix of exploration
and exploitation strategies.
The ε-greedy algorithm selects random proposed match with ε proba-
bility and best proposed match with (1− ε) probability. A random proposed
match is a match proposed uniformly at random from the set of all match-
ings M . The proposed match µ(i) for rider i ∈ N , given the utility ui,µ(i), is
selected as,argmaxµ∈M ui,µ(i), if probability 1− εrandom proposed match, if probability ε
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For example, if ε = 0.05, the algorithm will exploit the best option
95% of the time and will explore random alternatives 5% of the time. The
constant exploration probability ε provides linear growth in total expected
regret. According to Kuleshov and Precup [KP14], for each time step t and
for each rider i ∈ N , ε-greedy algorithm with exploration probability ε =
t
−1
3 · (|N | log t)1/3 achieves regret bound,
E[Ri(t)] ≤ t2/3 ·O(|N | log t)1/3
The above equation indicates the regret for learning the expected utilities of
the riders in our algorithm. Since exploration is random as it chooses the
match uniformly at random from the set of matchings M , there is no loss
of expectation. The ε-greedy algorithm guarantees the expected mean utility
will gradually converge towards the utility sampled from the distribution for
all riders.
Example 4. Assume there are four riders r1, r2, r3 and r4. For r1,
at first time step, the utilities for matching with r2, r3, and r4 is randomly
sampled from probability distributions unknown to the mode as [0.4, 0.4, 0.2].
Let ε = 0.1, initial expected utility vector for r1 is [−∞, 0, 0, 0], and expected
mean utility of r1 is 0. For first time step, the probability is 0.02. So r1
will choose a match randomly between the alternative riders. Say, it chooses
r3, then µ(r1) = r3 and ur1,r3 = 0.4. Now, estimated utility vector for r1 is
[−∞, 0, 0.4, 0] and mean estimated utility of r1 is 0.4. For second time step,
the probability is now 0.3, so r1 will choose a match with maximum expected
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utility, which is µ(r1) = r3. After every time step is completed, the expected
utility vector and expected mean utility for r1 is saved and reinitialized for the
next time step with another sample from the probability distributions.
3.5.2 UCB1
The UCB1 algorithm is part of the UCB family of algorithms as a sim-
pler algorithm based on principle of optimism during uncertainity [ACBF02].
The UCB1 algorithm builds an optimistic guess on the best proposed match
and chooses that action. If the guess is wrong, the payoff for the optimistic
guess decreases and the optimistic guess changes to another action. It the
guess is right, it exploits the actions. This results in mininal regret.
UCB1 maintain the number of times that each match has been proposed
for each rider i ∈ N , denoted by mi,µ(i)(t), in addition to the expected mean
utilities. Initially each match is selected once. Then, at time-step t ∈ |T |, the
algorithm selects the match µt(i) as







According to Auer et.al. [ACBF02], at time-step t, for rider i, the expected





















The model is implemented in Python. The experiments are run for
up to 14 riders. For each experiment, the utilities are sampled from either of
the three distributions: truncated normal distribution, uniform distribution,
and binomial distribution. The distributions are selected for comparing the
performance of the algorithm on different utility samples. The experiment is
implemented with three values of ε for ε-greedy algorithm: ε = 0, ε = 0.01,
ε = 0.1, and UCB1 algorithm. Each experiment is run for 1000 simulations
for constant utilities and for utilities from stationary distributions. The code
snippets for the algorithms are provided in Appendix B. Below we describe
each of the distributions.
Truncated Normal Distribution. The truncated normal distribution is
a continuous probability distribution derived from normal distribution which
is made finite by bounding either below or above or both [Bur14]. For this
experiment, the distribution is bounded between 0 and 1. Each distribution
has a different mean and variance, which are uniformly sampled between 0
and 1.
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Uniform Distribution. The uniform distribution is a continuous probabil-
ity distribution that lies between certain bounds where each sample of the
distribution has the same probability [DKLM05]. The bounds are defined by
the minimum and maximum values, which are 0 and 1, respectively.
Binomial Distribution. The binomial distribution is a discrete probability
distribution where the values are based on number of successes based on the
success probability p: 1 (with probability p) and 0 (with probability 1 − p)
[Wyp14]. For this experiment, the value of p is sampled uniformly at random
from values ranging from 0.1 to 0.9.
The steps involved in each experiment are as follows:
1. Sample utilities from respective distributions.
2. Run the reinforcement learning algorithms for all the riders. The algo-
rithm does the following:
(a) Learn the expected utilities of all riders while maximizing the social
welfare of the riders.
(b) Compute maximum welfare to provide the socially optimal match-
ing using the following:
i. Utilitarian social welfare
ii. Egalitarian social welfare
iii. Nash social Welfare
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iv. Leximin social welfare
(c) Compute number of strong and weak blocking pairs in each socially
optimal matching.
4.2 Results
The results are displayed for the algorithm running on 14 riders. The
results of the algorithms running on 6 and 10 riders are provided in Appendix
A.
4.2.1 Constant utilities
Constant utilities are the utilities that are fixed over time. For each
rider i ∈ N , 2n− 1 utilities are sampled from the respective distributions and
used for all the time-steps.
Learning expected utilities. Figure 4.1 compares the three ε-greedy al-
gorithms (ε = 0.0, 0.01, 0.1) and UCB1 algorithm for 14 riders on constant
utilities from truncated normal distributions. The ε-greedy algorithm with
ε = 0.0 levels off at a lower level because it often gets stuck selecting sub-
optimal proposed match due to no exploration. The ε-greedy algorithm with
ε = 0.01 and ε = 0.1 eventually perform better because they continue to
explore and to improve the chances of recognizing the best-proposed match.
The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 explores more and finds the best pro-
posed match earlier. UCB1 performs at a more steady rate by calculating the
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of 14 riders learning their best match with constant
utilities from truncated normal distributions.
optimistic guess of the best proposed match at each time step. The initial
spike in UCB1 accuracy is due to selecting each proposed match once during
the initial time-steps. The result is consistent with smaller number of riders.
Welfare of socially optimal matchings. For computing Nash welfare of
a matching, we need to find the product of the utilities of each rider. Since,
utility of a rider could be zero, the resulting Nash welfare of the matching
also becomes zero. Therefore, we compute the Nash welfare of a matching by
taking the product of only non-zero utilities of the riders in a matching.
31
Figure 4.2 shows the welfare of socially optimal matching computed
using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering from the expected
utilities learned by the three ε-greedy and UCB1 algorithms for 14 riders with
constant utilities from truncated normal distributions. The ε-greedy algorithm
with ε = 0.1 and UCB1 algorithms provide the maximum social welfare in
each of the socially optimal matchings. The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1
converges earlier than UCB1 algorithm. The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1
converges in about 100 time-steps while UCB1 algorithm takes about 350
time-steps to converge. Both ε-greedy with ε = 0.1 and UCB1 converges to
the actual welfare. The results of the ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.0, ε = 0.1,
and UCB1 algorithm holds for smaller number of riders (Figure 4.3). However,
the ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.01 converges faster as the number of riders
decrease. The jumps in the plots of Figure 4.3 indicates exploration by ε-
greedy with ε = 0.1 where they explore other other matches rather than pick
the match with maximum utility for the time step.
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Figure 4.2: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 14 riders with constant utilities from truncated normal
distributions (Legend same for all image).
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Figure 4.3: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 6, 8, and 10 riders with constant utilities from truncated
normal distributions (Legend same for all image).
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Blocking pairs in socially optimal matchings. For constant utilities
in general, the ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 outperforms the other three
algorithms in terms of accuracy in learning the expected utilities of the riders.
However, UCB1 algorithm provides higher social welfare in the socially optimal
matchings.
All strong blocking pairs are likewise weak blocking pairs, so the strong
blocking pairs are not counted in the plots of weak blocking pairs. Figure 4.4
and Figure 4.5 display the number of blocking pairs in the socially optimal
matching computed using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering
from expected utilities learned by the ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 and
UCB1 algorithms for 14 riders with constant utilities from truncated normal
distributions. For some time steps, the number of strong and weak blocking
pairs remain the same over the time steps because the reinforcement algorithms
select the same proposed match over the time steps. Due to more exploration
and selecting different proposed match at the initial time-steps, the strong and
weak number of blocking pairs fluctuate for the ε-greedy algorithm with ε =
0.1. For UCB1 algorithm, the number of strong and weak number of blocking
pairs is consistent over the time steps. However, for smaller number of riders,
the number of strong and weak blocking pairs are consistent for both UCB1 and
ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1. For both ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 and
UCB1, the socially optimal matching computed using utilitarian social welfare
has fewer number of blocking pairs compared to that of egalitarian, Nash, and
leximin social welfare. The result holds for smaller number of riders.
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Figure 4.4: Number of blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed
using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from
expected utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 14 riders with constant utilities from
truncated normal distributions.
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Figure 4.5: Number of blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed
using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from
expected utilities learned by UCB1 for 14 riders with constant utilities from
truncated normal distributions.
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4.2.2 Utilities from stationary distributions
Utilities from stationary distributions are the utilities that are sampled
for each time step. For each time-step and each rider i ∈ N , 2n − 1 utilities
are sampled from the respective distributions.
Learning expected utilities. Figure 4.6 compares the three ε-greedy al-
gorithms (ε = 0.0, 0.01, 0.1) and UCB1 algorithm along with the error bars
for 14 riders on utilities from stationary distributions using truncated normal
distributions. The plots in the figure show the percentage of the best pro-
posed match selected for the current time step. It does not indicate the best
expected match for the riders. The reinforcement learning algorithms for util-
ities don’t usually converge since the utilities sampled are changing over each
time-step, and there is no fixed value for the algorithms to converge. How-
ever, the greedy algorithm (ε = 0.0) seems to perform as much as the other
algorithms. The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 appears to perform slightly
better by exploring the choices more to find the best-proposed match. While
the average percentage of best proposed match selected by the riders increase
for all reinforcement algorithms with smaller number of riders, the result still
holds.
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of 14 riders learning their best match with utilities
from stationary distributions using truncated normal distributions.
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Welfare of socially optimal matchings. Figure 4.7 shows the welfare
of socially optimal matching computed using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash,
and leximin ordering from the expected utilities learned by the three ε-greedy
and UCB1 algorithms for 14 riders with utilities from stationary distributions
using truncated normal distributions. UCB1 algorithm provides the maximum
utilitarian, egalitarian and leximin social welfare, which is slightly better than
the ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 and ε = 0.01. The maximum Nash social
welfare is similar to all the algorithms. The initial spike in UCB1 algorithm
is due to each rider choosing each possible match atleast once to calculate the
optimistic guess for finding the best rider to match with. Due to the high
welfare during the initial time-step, the plot displays welfare as converging to
zero over the time steps. However, the welfare for each algorithm is not zero
but ranging between 0.00001 − 0.2. However, UCB1 provides slightly higher
Nash social welfare. Also, UCB1 algorithm provides social welfare closest to
the actual welfare of the matchings if the utilities were known. The result
holds for smaller number of riders (Figure 4.8).
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Figure 4.7: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 14 riders with utilities from stationary distributions using
truncated normal distributions (Legend same for all image).
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Figure 4.8: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 6, 8, and 10 riders with utilities from stationary distribu-
tions using truncated normal distributions (Legend same for all image).
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Blocking pairs in socially optimal matchings. Figure 4.9 and Figure
4.10 display the number of blocking pairs in the socially optimal matching
computed using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering from ex-
pected utilities learned by ε = 0.1 and UCB1 algorithms for 14 riders with
utilities from stationary distributions using truncated normal distributions.
ε = 0.1 has less number of strong and weak blocking pairs in socially optimal
matching using utilitarian social welfare than that of UCB1 algorithm. For
both ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 and UCB1, the socially optimal matching
computed using utilitarian social welfare has fewer number of blocking pairs
compared to that of egalitarian, Nash, and leximin social welfare. The result
holds for smaller number of riders. For both ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1
and UCB1, the socially optimal matching computed using utilitarian social
welfare has fewer number of blocking pairs compared to that of egalitarian,
Nash, and leximin social welfare. The result holds for smaller number of riders.
The experiments with binomial and uniform distributions provide sim-
ilar results to that of truncated normal distributions. The plots are shown in
the Appendix A along with the individual accuracy plots with error bars for
each ε-greedy and UCB1 algorithm.
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Figure 4.9: Number of blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed
using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from
expected utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 14 riders with utilities from stationary
distributions using truncated normal distributions.
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Figure 4.10: Number of blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed
using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from
expected utilities learned by UCB1 for 14 riders with utilities from stationary
distributions using truncated normal distributions.
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4.2.3 Welfare for matchings with larger number of riders
To provide the socially optimal matchings, we compute the social wel-
fare of all possible matchings M using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and lex-
imin ordering based on the expected utility matrix U learned using the rein-
forcement learning algorithms. However, computing the social welfare for all
possible matchings, in general, is an NP-hard problem [RR10]. The number
of possible matchings increases exponentially as the number of riders increase.
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show the welfare of matchings received from the
reinforcement learning algorithms while learning the expected utilities at each
time step for 50 and 100 riders, respectively. The utilities are sampled from
stationary distributions using truncated normal distributions. The matchings
are selected using a greedy approach. The expected utility of each match
is computed based on the expected utility matrix learned. The matching is
selected by the algorithm as follows:
Algorithm 1: Greedy approach to select matching for larger
number of riders
Input: Utility matrix U
Output: Matching µ
select match (i, j) with highest utility and add to µ;
while all riders not matched do
select next match (i, j) with highest utility;




We are not able to provide any insight on the socially optimal match-
ings for 50 and 100 riders since computing all the possible matchings for 50
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and 100 riders are not possible with the current computational power. How-
ever, from the figures, we can infer the UCB1 algorithm outperforms all other
reinforcement learning algorithms to provide the matchings with higher so-
cial welfare computed using utilitarian and Nash welfare concepts. The initial
spike in the UCB1 algorithm is due to each rider choosing each possible match
at least once. Due to the high welfare during the initial time-step, the plot dis-
plays welfare as converging to zero over the time steps. However, the welfare
for each algorithm is not zero but ranging between 0.0000001 − 0.0001. For
welfare computed using egalitarian social welfare, the ε-greedy algorithm with
ε = 0.1 provides higher welfare than the UCB1 algorithm in some time-steps,
however, UCB1 algorithm provides consistent egalitarian social welfare of the
matchings after the initial time steps. This happens mainly due to ε-greedy
algorithm with ε = 0.1 exploring matches which has not been explored before
(matches with zero utility), increasing the minimum utility of the matchings.
The welfare computed using leximin social welfare is not shown as it is the
same as the plot of egalitarian social welfare. Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 show
the number of blocking pairs in the matchings selected using greedy approach
for 50 and 100 riders, respectively. The ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 pro-
duce fewer number of blocking pairs in the matchings using greedy approach
than the UCB1 algorithm.
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Figure 4.11: The welfare of matchings based on greedy approach for 50 riders
with utilities from stationary distributions using truncated normal distribu-
tions (Legend same for all image).
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Figure 4.12: The welfare of matchings based on greedy approach for 100 riders
with utilities from stationary distributions using truncated normal distribu-
tions (Legend same for all image).
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Figure 4.13: Number of blocking pairs in matchings based on greedy approach
learning algorithms for 50 riders with utilities from stationary distributions
using truncated normal distributions.
Figure 4.14: Number of blocking pairs in matchings based on greedy approach






The utilities of the riders can be learned using reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms to provide a socially optimal matching among the riders. We
present a reinforcement learning model that learns the expected utilities of
the riders similar to a multi-agent multi-armed bandit. We compute the social
welfare using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering to provide the
socially optimal matchings. The number of strong and weak blocking pairs is
calculated for the socially optimal matchings. The ε-greedy and UCB1 al-
gorithms are implemented to learn the expected utilities. The ε-greedy with
ε = 0.1 outperforms other algorithms in terms of accuracy in learning the
expected utilities of the riders. UCB1 provides the socially optimal matching
with higher social welfare for each social welfare concept. Socially optimal
matchings computed using the ε-greedy algorithm with ε = 0.1 has a lower
number of blocking pairs in general as compared to that of UCB1 algorithm
suggesting more stability of the matchings. Since, we are trying to maximize
the social welfare of socially optimal matchings, UCB1 performs the best since
it provide maximum welfare for all social welfare concepts.
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5.2 Future Work
The model implements ε-greedy and UCB1 algorithm to learn the ex-
pected utilities of the riders. There are other reinforcement learning algorithms
which theoretically, should provide higher accuracy for learning expected util-
ities [GM11, BGZ14]. The model could be extended to implement other re-
inforcement learning algorithms to analyze if they perform better than the
algorithms implemented in the model with respect to learning the expected
utilities, social welfare, and stability of the matchings.
The model provides the socially optimal matchings by computing the
social welfare of all the possible matching using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash,
and leximin ordering. Calculating the Social Welfare for all possible matching
in general is an NP-hard problem [RR10]. With the current computational
power, the model can compute matchings for up to 14 riders. There are many
ongoing research on the theoretical analysis and the approximation of social
welfare [RE10, AKWX15, NRR12, BMV18]. One future direction is to extend
the model to approximate the utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin social
welfare to find the socially optimal matching for a higher number of riders.
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[BM01] Anna Bogomolnaia and Hervé Moulin. A new solution to the ran-
dom assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2):295
– 328, 2001.
54
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A.1 Truncated normal distributions
62
Figure A.1: Percentage with error bars of 6 riders learning their best match
with constant utilities using truncated normal distributions.
63
Figure A.2: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 6 riders with constant utilities using truncated normal
distributions.
64
Figure A.3: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 6 riders with constant utilities using truncated
normal distributions.
65
Figure A.4: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by UCB1 for 6 riders with constant utilities using truncated
normal distributions.
66
Figure A.5: Percentage with error bars of 6 riders learning their best match
with utilities from stationary distributions using truncated normal distribu-
tions.
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Figure A.6: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 6 riders with utilities from stationary distributions using
truncated normal distributions.
68
Figure A.7: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 6 riders with utilities from stationary distribu-
tions using truncated normal distributions.
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Figure A.8: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by UCB1 for 6 riders with utilities from stationary distribu-
tions using truncated normal distributions.
70
Figure A.9: Percentage with error bars of 10 riders learning their best match
with utilities from stationary distributions using truncated normal distribu-
tions.
71
Figure A.10: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 10 riders with constant utilities using truncated normal
distributions.
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Figure A.11: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 10 riders with constant utilities using truncated
normal distributions.
73
Figure A.12: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by UCB1 for 10 riders with constant utilities using truncated
normal distributions.
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Figure A.13: Percentage with error bars of 10 riders learning their best match
with utilities from stationary distributions using truncated normal distribu-
tions.
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Figure A.14: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 10 riders with utilities from stationary distributions using
truncated normal distributions.
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Figure A.15: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 10 riders with utilities from stationary distri-
butions using truncated normal distributions.
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Figure A.16: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by UCB1 for 10 riders with utilities from stationary distribu-
tions using truncated normal distributions.
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Figure A.17: Percentage with error bars of 14 riders learning their best match
with constant utilities using truncated normal distributions.
A.2 Uniform distributions
79
Figure A.18: Percentage with error bars of 14 riders learning their best match
with constant utilities using uniform distributions.
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Figure A.19: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 14 riders with constant utilities using uniform distribu-
tions.
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Figure A.20: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 14 riders with constant utilities using uniform
distributions.
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Figure A.21: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by UCB1 for 14 riders with constant utilities using uniform
distributions.
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Figure A.22: Percentage with error bars of 14 riders learning their best match
with utilities from stationary distributions using uniform distributions.
84
Figure A.23: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 14 riders with utilities from stationary distributions using
uniform distributions.
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Figure A.24: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 14 riders with utilities from stationary distri-
butions using uniform distributions.
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Figure A.25: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by UCB1 for 14 riders with utilities from stationary distribu-




Figure A.26: Percentage with error bars of 14 riders learning their best match
with constant utilities using binomial distributions.
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Figure A.27: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 14 riders with constant utilities using binomial distribu-
tions.
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Figure A.28: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 14 riders with constant utilities using binomial
distributions.
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Figure A.29: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by UCB1 for 14 riders with constant utilities using binomial
distributions.
92
Figure A.30: Percentage with error bars of 14 riders learning their best match
with utilities from stationary distributions using binomial distributions.
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Figure A.31: The welfare of socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned for 14 riders with utilities from stationary distributions using
binomial distributions.
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Figure A.32: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by ε = 0.1 for 14 riders with utilities from stationary distri-
butions using binomial distributions.
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Figure A.33: Blocking pairs in socially optimal matching computed using util-
itarian, egalitarian, Nash, and leximin ordering, respectively from expected
utilities learned by UCB1 for 14 riders with utilities from stationary distribu-




Figure B.1: ε-greedy algorithm
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Figure B.2: UCB1 algorithm
Figure B.3: Sampling utilities from respective distributions
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Figure B.4: Finding the set of possible matchings M
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Figure B.5: Computing maximum welfare using utilitarian, egalitarian, Nash,
and leximin social welfare
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Figure B.6: Computing number of blocking pairs in a matching
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